We study the physical-layer security of a spectrum-sharing heterogeneous wireless network in the face of an eavesdropper, which is composed of multiple source-destination (SD) pairs, where an eavesdropper intends to wiretap the signal transmitted by the SD pairs. In order to protect the wireless transmission against eavesdropping, we propose a heterogeneous cooperation framework relying on two stages. Specifically, an SD pair is selected to access the shared spectrum using an appropriately designed scheme at the beginning of the first stage. The other source nodes (SNs) transmit their data to the SN of the above-mentioned SD pair through a reliable short-range wireless interface during the first stage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Heterogeneous wireless networks can access the same spectrum resource dynamically with the aid of spectrum sharing techniques [1] , [2] , which are capable of increasing the system's efficiency and flexibility, whilst reducing their deployment cost. Recently, the spectrum sharing concept has also been extended to the fifth-generation (5G) systems [3] , [4] , wherein the licensed and unlicensed spectrum can be flexibly utilized to improve the quality of experience. However, heterogeneous wireless systems may be vulnerable to both internal as well as to external attackers, when they operate independently in non-cooperative scenarios. For example, a hostile attacker may contaminate the legitimate transmission, thus degrading the quality of service (QoS).
Furthermore, owing to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, the confidential messages may be overheard by malicious eavesdroppers. Hence, we have to protect the heterogeneous wireless networks against malicious eavesdropping.
Physical-layer security [5] - [7] emerges as an effective method of guarding against wiretapping by exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless channels. Single-input multiple-output (SIMO) and multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) schemes were conceived in [8] , [9] for reducing the secrecy outage probability. Similarly, beamforming techniques were also invoked for improving the secrecy of wireless transmissions [10] and [11] . Moreover, the concept of cognitive jamming was explored in [12] , while specially designed artificial noise was used for preventing eavesdropping in [13] . Furthermore, the authors of [14] and [15] explored opportunistic user scheduling conceived with cooperative jamming. More specifically, in [15] , the non-scheduled users of the proposed user scheduling scheme were invoked for generating artificial noise in order to improve security in a multiuser wiretap network. Both one-way [16] , [17] and two-way [18] , [19] relying schemes were conceived for guarding against eavesdropping, demonstrating that relay selection schemes are capable of improving the physical-layer security. This is indeed expected, because they improve the quality of the desired link.
As a further development, physical-layer security has also been designed for heterogeneous wireless networks, supporting a multiplicity of diverse devices. Hence, more efforts should be invested in enhancing the physical-layer security of heterogeneous wireless networks. The secrecy beamforming concept has been proposed by Lv et al. [20] for improving the physicallayer security of heterogeneous networks. Moreover, jamming schemes have been investigated in [21] and [22] . To be specific, in [21] , the jammers were selected to transmit jamming signals for contaminating the wiretapping reception of the eavesdroppers. Meanwhile, the interfering power imposed on the scheduled users was assumed to be below a threshold. A comprehensive performance analysis of artificial-noise aided secure multi-antenna transmission relying on a stochastic geometry framework was provided in [22] for K-tier heterogeneous cellar networks.
In [23] , antenna selection was used for improving the security of source-destination transmissions in a multiple antenna aided MIMO system consisting of one source, one destination and one eavesdropper. Furthermore, the co-existence of a macro cell and a small cell constituting a simple heterogeneous cellular network was investigated by Zou [24] . Specifically, the overlay and underlay spectrum sharing schemes have been invoked for a macro cell and a small cell, respectively. Moreover, an interference-cancelation scheme was proposed for mitigating the interference in the underlay spectrum sharing case. In [25] , Tolossa et al. investigated the basestation-user association scenarios suitable for protecting the ongoing transmission between the base-station and the intended user against eavesdropping. Additionally, the achievable average secrecy rate was analyzed by exploiting the association both with the "best" and with the kth best base-stations.
Against this backdrop, in this paper, we explore the physical-layer security of a heterogeneous wireless network comprised of multiple source-destination (SD) pairs in the presence of an eavesdropper. In contrast to [20] - [25] , we investigate the cooperation between different SD pairs for safeguarding against malicious eavesdropping with the aid of a specifically designed cooperative framework, and the main differences between this paper and [20] - [25] are summarized in table 1 . Moreover, we propose a pair of cooperation schemes based on source-destination (SD) pair scheduling. More explicitly, against this background, the main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) Firstly, we propose a heterogeneous cooperative framework relying on two stages for protecting wireless transmissions against eavesdropping, Specifically, in the first stage, an SD pair will be chosen at the beginning of the transmission slot. Then, other source nodes (SNs) will confidentially transmit their data to the chosen SN via a high-reliablility lowpower auxiliary sub-system. In the second stage, the specifically chosen SN transmits the repacked data to its destination node (DN), which will forward the received packets to the DNs of the other SNs via the secure backhaul.
2) Secondly, we present two specific transmission selection schemes. The first one is termed as the space-time coding aided source-destination pair scheduling (STC-SDPS), while the second one is referred to as the transmit antenna selection aided source-destination pair scheduling (TAS-SDPS). To be specific, an SD pair having the maximal channel capacity will be regarded as the transmission pair with the aid of the shared spectrum in the STC-SDPS scheme. By contrast, in the TAS-SDPS scheme, the "best" antenna of a chosen SD pair will be selected to transmit the repacked data relying on the shared spectrum.
3) Thirdly, we analyze the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the proposed STC-SDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes for transmission over Rayleigh fading channels. We also evaluate the SOP of the traditional round-robin transmission pair scheduling (RSDPS) scheme for comparison. Moreover, we evaluate the secrecy diversity gains of both the STC-SDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes as well as the RSDPS scheme, demonstrating that the STC-SDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes are capable of achieving the full secrecy diversity gain. 4) Finally, it is shown that the SOPs of the STC-SDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes will be beneficially reduced by increasing the number of SD transmission pairs. Furthermore, the STC-SDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes outperform the RSDPS scheme in terms of both the SOP and the secrecy diversity gain attained, demonstrating that the advantages of the proposed heterogeneous cooperative framework improves the security of wireless communications.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we briefly characterize the physicallayer security of a heterogeneous wireless network. In Section III, we carry out the SOP analysis of the RSDPS, STC-SDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes communicating over a Rayleigh channel. In Section IV we evaluate the secrecy diversity gain of the proposed STC-SDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes as well as of the RSDPS scheme. Our performance evaluations are detailed in Section VI. Finally, in Section V we conclude the paper. Table 1 Comparisons between our work and the related works [20] - [25] Our work [20] 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SD PAIRS SCHEDULING

A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider M source-destination (SD) pairs in the presence of an eavesdropper, where an SD is denoted by S i . This source node (SN) communicates with its corresponding destination node (DN) via the dynamically shared spectrum, i ∈ {1, · · · , M}, as well as with the other SNs via a reliable short-range interface (e.g., Zigbee, Bluetooth, etc.), since we assume that the distance between any two SNs is short. For notational convenience, we let D represent the set of the SD pairs. The eavesdropper is denoted by E, which intends to wiretap the legitimate SD pairs with the aid of a wide-band receiver. All nodes are assumed to be equipped with multiple antennas. All DNs are connected via a backhaul [26] , which has the ability of exchanging the signals received from the DNs. Moreover, both the main and the wiretap links are modeled by Rayleigh fading [17] , where the channel gains of the main links (spanning from the legitimate transmitter to its legitimate receiver) and the wiretap links (spanning from the legitimate transmitter to the eavesdropper) are denoted by h sm i dm j , h sm i e l and h s k e l , m, k ∈ {1, · · · , M}, k = m, i ∈ {1, · · · , N T }, j ∈ {1, · · · , N R }, l ∈ {1, · · · , N E }, respectively, where N T , N R , and N E denote the number of transmit antennas of S i , D i , and E, respectively.
The heterogeneous cooperative framework relies on two stages, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . To be specific, an SD pair will be chosen to dynamically access the shared spectrum according to two specific SD scheduling schemes at the beginning of the first stage, where the SD scheduling schemes only consider the links transmitting between the SNs and DNs, without considering the transmitting links between SNs. This is due to the fact that the SNs communicate with each other with the aid of a high-reliability low-power system, hence the outage probability of the links between a pair of SNs is lower than that of the SNs-DNs links. Moreover, in order to help other pairs transmit their data, the chosen SD pair will receive the data of the other nodes through a high-reliability short-range system, and repack the successfully decoded data and its own data. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , the sub-packet of a pair is comprised of three parts, which include the index of the SD pair, the length of the repacked data, and the repacked data. In the second stage, the specifically selected SN transmits the packet to its DN. After decoding the packet, the DN forwards the sub-packets to the other DNs relying on the index of the pair in the sub-packet via a high-speed backhaul.
B. Signal Model
In the first stage, let us assume that the SN S m is selected as the transmitting node. As mentioned above, other SNs will transmit their signal to S m via a high-reliability low-power system with the aid of a single antenna. Thus, the signal received at S m transmitted by S k , k ∈ D − {m}, is given by:
where P s , x k , h s k sm and n sm denotes the transmitted power of S k relying on a high-reliability low-power system, the transmitted signal of s k , the channel gain of the S k -S m link having zero mean and variance of σ 2 s k sm , and the thermal noise received at the S m , respectively.
In the meantime, the signal transmitted by S k will be overheard by E, which can be expressed as
where n e l represents the thermal noise received at E.
From (1) and (2), the channel capacity of the S k -S m and S k -E links can be expressed as
and
Ps|hs k e l | 2 N 0 , and B denotes the channel bandwidth.
In the second stage, S m transmits the packet x s . Thus, the signal received at D m can be formulated as
where P tx and n dm j denote the transmitted power of S m , and the thermal noise received at the S m , respectively. In the space-time coding (STC) case, for simplicity, we assume that the transmitted power of each antenna of S m is equal, thus, P tx = Pt N T , where P t represents the available transmit power of each SN. By contrast, we have P tx = P t in the transmit antenna selection (TAS) case.
Similarly to (3), the signal transmitted by S m will be overheard by E, which can be written as y sm i e l = P tx h sm i e l x s + n e l .
Relying on (5), the instantaneous channel capacity of the S m -D m and of the S m i -D m links in the STC and TAS cases can be formulated as
Pt|h sm i dm j | 2 N 0 , and N 0 denotes the variance of thermal noise n dm j and n e l .
Using (6) , the instantaneous channel capacity of the S m -E links can be expressed as
where
Pt|hs m i e l | 2 N 0 in the TAS case.
Using (4) and (9), the overall capacity of the link spanning from S k , k ∈ D −{m}, the wiretap channel from S m -E and S k -E can be obtained by using the maximum of the individual channel capacity of these two links in the first and second stages, i.e.
As mentioned above, given the chosen transmission pair, the signal of the chosen SD will only be transmitted during the second stage. By contrast, the signal of other SDs will be transmitted both during the first state and be forwarded in the second stage. Hence, the signal of the other SDs that are being overheard in the two stages has been given in (3) and (5), respectively.
Noting that although only selection combining (SC) is considered, here similar results can be achieved with the aid of maximal ratio combining (MRC). Moreover, as discussed in [16] , when independent and different codewords are used in the two stages, MRC becomes inapplicable, whereas SC is still suitable for the E.
C. Space-Time Coding Aided SD Scheduling
In this subsection, we propose a space-time coding aided source-destination scheduling (STC-SDPS) scheme for the sake of improving the security of the SDs's wireless transmissions, wherein an SD pair having the instantaneous channel capacity C smdm will be selected, yielding
where s denotes the index of the selected pair in the proposed STC-SDPS scheme. Hence, the secrecy capacity of the S k -D k and S s -D s links in the STC-SDPS scheme is given by C s STC = C ssds − C s sse and C k STC = C ssds − C k sse , respectively.
D. Transmit Antenna Selection Aided SD Pair Scheduling
This subsection proposes a transmit antenna selection aided source-destination pair scheduling (TAS-SDPS) scheme. In the TAS-SDPS scheme, the "best" antenna having the maximal channel capacity of all SDs in the set D will be chosen to access the shared spectrum for the sake of improving the security of the SDs' wireless transmissions. Therefore, based on (7) , the SD pair scheduling scheme in the TAS-SDPS can be formulated as
where s represents the index of the selected pair in the TAS-SDPS scheme, and a denotes the index of the chosen antenna of S s , yielding:
Therefore, the secrecy capacity of S k -D k and S s -D s in the TAS-SDPS scheme can be formulated as C s TAS = (C ss a ds − C s sse ) and C k TAS = (C ss a ds − C k sse ), respectively.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we present our performance analysis for the RSDPS, STC-SDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes for transmission over Rayleigh fading channels. The secrecy outage probability (SOP) expressions of the RSDPS scheduling as well as of the STC-SDPS and TAS-SDPS scheduling are derived.
A. Conventional RSDPS Scheme
This subsection provides the SOP analysis of the traditional RSDPS scheme used as a benchmarking scheme. In the conventional RSDPS scheme, each SD pair in the set D will be chosen to transmit with an equal probability. Therefore, according to the definition of SOP [7] , we can obtain the SOP of the signal arriving from S m and S k in the first as well as second stage for the RSDPS scheme relying on the S m -D m pair formulated as
respectively, where R s is a predefined secrecy rate. Upon combining (7), (9) and (10), we arrive at P RSDPS so m m = Pr
performing SD pair selection in the RSDPS scheme is independent of the random variables (RVs) |h sm i dm j | 2 and |h sm i e l | 2 . For simplicity, given the SD transmission pair m, we assume that the fading coefficients |h sm i dm j | 2 for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N T }, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N R }, of all main channels are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) RVs with the same mean, denoted
. Moreover, we also assume that the fading coefficients |h sm i e l | 2 for Hence, the SOP of the system investigated relying on S m can be defined as
where P out k m = Pr(C s k sm < R o ) = 1−exp(− Ro σ 2 s k sm ) = a km , and R o is the data rate of a pair of SNs links.
As mentioned above, in the RSDPS scheme, each SD pair has an equal probability to be chosen. Furthermore, using the law of total probability [29] , we can obtain the SOP for the RSDPS scheme as
B. Proposed STC-SDPS Scheme
Let us now analyze the SOP of the STC-SDPS scheme in this subsection. In the STC-SDPS scheme, an SD pair having the maximal channel capacity will be selected to participate in transmitting the messages from the source to the destination. As discussed in (11) , the index of the chosen pair associated with the STC-SDPS scheme is denoted by s. Hence, the SOP of the signal arriving from S s and S k under the STC-SDPS scheme with the aid of the S s -D s pair can be shown to be
respectively.
Substituting C ssds and C sse from (7), (9)-(10) into (20) and (21) yields
In the spirit of [27] , it is shown that performing the optimal user selection for the SD pairs can be viewed as being equivalent to the random pair selection for the E. Thus, using (11), both (22) and (23) can be expanded as
Using (A.10) and (A.11), both (24) and (25) can be obtained. Similarly to (18) , the SOP of the STC-SDPS scheme may be formulated as
where P out k s is given by P out k m , since for simplicity, we assume that the channel gains of each pair of SNs are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d).
C. Proposed TAS-SDPS Scheme
In this subsection, we present the SOP analysis of the TAS-SDPS scheme. As shown in (12) 
Using (8)-(10), both (27) and (28) can be rewritten as
respectively, where we have Λ 0 = (2 2·Rs B − 1)N 0 /P t , and Λ 1 = P t /P s . Similarly to (24) and (25), based on (13), we arrive at:
Finally, using (A.17) and (A.18), both (31) and (32) can be obtained. Moreover, relying on the definition in (18) , the SOP of the investigated system relying on the proposed TAS-SDPS scheme can be expressed as:
IV. SECRECY DIVERSITY GAIN ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the secrecy diversity analysis of the RSDPS, STC-SDPS, and TAS-SDPS schemes in the high MER region for the sake of providing further insights from (16), (17) , (24), (25) , (31) and (32) conceiving both the conventional RSDPS as well as the proposed STC-SDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes.
A. Traditional RSDPS Scheme
This subsection analyzes the asymptotic SOP of the conventional RSDPS scheme. In the spirit of [28] , the traditional diversity gain is defined as
which is used for characterizing the reliability of wireless communications, where SNR and P e (SNR) denote the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the destination node and the bit error ratio (BER), respectively. However, we can observe that the SOPs of the RSDPS, STC-SDPS, and TAS-SDPS schemes are independent of the SNR, hence the definition of the traditional diversity gain may not perfectly suit our SOP analysis. Moreover, as shown in (16), (17), (24) , (25), (31) and (32), the SOP of the RSDPS scheme is related to the main channel |h sm i dm j | 2 as
well as to the eavesdropping channels |h sm i e l | 2 and |h s k e l | 2 . For notational convenience again, let λ se = σ 2 md /σ 2 me denote the MER. In spirit of the above observation, we define the secrecy diversity gain as the asymptotic ratio of the logarithmic SOP to the logarithmic MER λ se as λ se → ∞, which is mathematically formulated as
Meanwhile, in (35), the SOP P so behaves as λ −d se in the high MER region, which means that upon increasing the diversity gain d, P so decreases faster in the high MER region.
Using (35), the secrecy diversity gain of the RSDPS scheme can be expressed as
Moreover, using the inequality
Based on (B.12) and (B.13), (37) can be reformulated as (38) shown at the top of the following page.
Combining (36) and (38) yields
Furthermore, in the high-SNR region we can observe from (17) that as the transmit power P t tends to infinity, ∆ 0 approaches zero. Substituting the inequality
Similarly to (37), (40) can be reformulated as (41) shown at the top of the following page,
Moreover, substituting (41) into (36) yields
Therefore, based on (39) and (42), the secrecy diversity gain of the conventional RSDPS scheme can be expressed as
which shows that the RSDPS scheme only attains a secrecy diversity gain of N T N R , and results in the SOP of the RSDPS scheme behaving as ( 1 λse ) N T N R in the high-MER region.
B. Proposed STC-SDPS Scheme
This subsection presents the secrecy diversity gain analysis of the STC-SDPS scheme. Similarly to (36), the secrecy diversity order of the STC-SDPS scheme is defined as
Based on the inequality max
, a lower bound on the SOP of the STC-SDPS scheme can be calculated as
From (B.14) and (B.15), we arrive at (46) shown at the top of the following page.
Furthermore, utilizing the inequality max
, we can formulate an upper bound on the SOP of the
proposed STC-SDPS scheme as
Similarly to (45), (48) can be reformulated as (49) shown at the top of the following page,
. Using (44) and (49), we arrive at
Hence, the secrecy diversity gain of the proposed STC-SDPS scheme can be expressed as
It can be observed from (51) that the proposed STC-SDPS scheme achieves the secrecy diversity gain of MN T N R , which means that the SOP of the STC-SDPS scheme behaves as ( 1 λse ) M N T N R in the high-MER region. Therefore, the STC-SDPS scheme advocated significantly outperforms the conventional RSDPS scheme in terms of its SOP.
(54)
C. Proposed TAS-SDPS Scheme
This subsection is focused on the secrecy diversity analysis of the TAS-SDPS scheme. Similarly to (36), the secrecy diversity order of the TAS-SDPS scheme can be expressed as
Thus, let us analyze the secrecy diversity analysis of the TAS-SDPS scheme. Considering the inequality max
With the aid of (B.14) and (B.15), we arrive at (54) shown at the top of the following page,
Furthermore, upon considering an infinite SNR and using the inequality max
Similarly to (53), (56) can be expanded as (57) shown at the top of the following page, where
Hence, upon using (52) and (57), we obtain
By combining (55) and (58), we arrive at the secrecy diversity gain of the proposed TAS-SDPS scheme as
Therefore, we can see from (51) 
and P Non so can be obtained similarly to (16) . In Fig. 3 , we show the SOP versus MER λ se of both the traditional RSDPS and of the Non-coop as well as of the proposed TAS-SDPS and STC-SDPS schemes for different pa- It is shown in Fig. 3 that the SOPs of the RSDPS, of the Non-coop, of the TAS-SDPS and of the STC-SDPS schemes decrease, as the number of antennas (N T , N R , N E ) increases from (N T , N R , N E ) = (1, 1, 1) to (2, 2, 2). Furthermore, the RSDPS, the Non-coop, the TAS-SDPS and the STC-SDPS schemes using (N T , N R , N E ) = (2, 2, 2) achieve better secrecy performance than that of (N T , N R , N E ) = (1, 1, 1), respectively. Fig. 3 also demonstrates that increasing the MER upgrades the security of wireless transmissions in heterogeneous networks. Additionally, Fig. 3 demonstrates that the TAS-SDPS scheme attains the best SOP performance among the traditional RSDPS and Non-coop as well as the proposed TAS-SDPS and STC-SDPS schemes, when the MER increases from -10dB to 10dB. Fig. 4 illustrates the SOP versus the SNR Pt N 0 of the traditional RSDPS and of Non-coop as well as of the proposed TAS-SDPS and STC-SDPS schemes. Fig. 4 shows that increasing the SNR Pt N 0 may moderately degrade the SOPs of the RSDPS, of the Non-coop as well as of the proposed TAS-SDPS and STC-SDPS schemes in the MER = 0dB case. By contrast, upon increasing the SNR, the SOPs of all schemes decreases are significantly reduced in the MER = 8dB case. This can be explained by observing that increasing the SNR is beneficial both for the SNs-DNs links and for the SNs-E links in the MER = 0dB case. However, increasing the SNR may be more beneficial for the SNs-DNs links than for the SNs-E links in the MER = 8dB case. Furthermore, it can also be seen from Fig. 4 that the SOPs of the proposed TAS-SDPS and STC-SDPS schemes are lower than those of the RSDPS and Non-coop schemes at a specific SNR. In contrast to the Non-coop and RSDPS schemes, this means that the security performance benefits from exploiting the cooperation between the SD pairs by guarding against eavesdropping with the aid of proposed TAS-SDPS and STC-SDPS schemes. 
|h sm i e l | 2 , and X 2 = N E l=1 |h s k e l | 2 , and taking into account that the RVs |h sm i dm j | 2 , |h s k e l | 2 , and |h sm i e l | 2 are independent of each other, P RSDPS so m m and P RSDPS so k m can be expressed as
and P RSDPS so k m = Pr
and f X 2 (x 2 ) are the probability density functions (PDFs) of the RVs X 1 and X 2 , respectively.
Based on [8] , they can be expressed as:
respectively. Substituting (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.1) yields
where a lp =
Similarly, P STC so s and P STC so k can be rewritten as
Relying on [9] , substituting (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.8) yields
Furthermore, upon using (A.3)-(A.5), we arrive at
|h sm i e l | 2 , and W 2 = N E l=1 |h s k e l | 2 , and exploiting that the RVs Q, W 1 and W 2 are independent of each other, P TAS so s and P TAS so k can be formulated as P TAS so s = Pr max
and P TAS so k = Pr max
Based on [8] , F Q (w), f W 1 (w 1 ) and f W 2 (w 2 ) can be formulated as:
respectively. Substituting (A.14) and (A.15) into (A.12) yields
Using (A.14)-(A. 16) , we arrive at
APPENDIX B
Upon defining
|h sm i e l | 2 ) and Pr(max
) can be rewritten as
is the CDF of the RV Y , while f X 1 (x 1 ) and f X 2 (x 2 ) are the PDFs of the RVs X 1 and X 2 , respectively.
Noting that the RVs |h sm i e l | 2 and |h s k e l | 2 obey the exponential distribution and are independent of each other, i = 1, 2, · · · , N T , l = 1, 2, · · · , N E , the CDF of X 1 can be expressed as:
where |C n | is the cardinality of the set C n , and C n denotes the n-th non-empty subset of C.
Moreover, C represents the set of the links spanning from a SN to the eavesdropper E in the second stage.
Hence, the PDF of the RV X 1 can be formulated as
(B.4)
Similarly, the PDF of the RV X 2 is given by where |F g | represents the cardinality of the set F g , and F g is the g-th non-empty subset of F .
Moreover, F denotes the set of the links spanning from a SN to the eavesdropper E in the first stage.
Furthermore,
(B.6)
For notational convenience, we introduce Z 1 = − 2 Then, E(Z 1 ) is given by
where a ngt = For notational convenience, upon denoting σ 2 sm i e l = α sm i e l σ 2 me , σ 2 s k e l = α s k e l σ 2 me and σ 2 sm i dm j α sm i dm j σ 2 md , we have 
